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Recent scholarship has brought into focus the downside risks of constitution
making moments. Ideally, constitution making would help to establish or rejuvenate 
a democratic order. But across a range of recent cases, constitution making has 
helped to erode democracy or to increase political tension, rather than strengthening 
the democratic order and bridging political and social divisions. Would be 
authoritarian actors and movements can use a number of different devices to 
undermine democracy, including the tools of constitutional change.1 Replacement 
of the existing constitution may be a particularly efficient way for powerful actors 
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1.  See David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 191 (2013) 
[hereinafter Landau, Abusive].
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to entrench themselves, to weaken institutions intended to check their power and 
protect minority rights, and to marginalize political opposition groups. 
There are several well studied recent examples. In both Venezuela and 
Ecuador, powerful presidents (Hugo Chavez and Rafael Correa) rewrote 
constitutions shortly after taking office and used the constitution making process 
as a way to weaken opposition groups and undermine democracy.2 In both cases, 
the constitution making process excluded the opposition and the resulting 
constitutions strengthened presidential power while weakening the power of other 
institutions.3 Similarly, in Hungary, the Fidesz party used its two thirds majority in 
Parliament to replace the existing constitution after having previously passed a series 
of amendments designed to weaken the judiciary and otherwise undermine checks 
on its power.4 The resulting constitution has again been criticized for entrenching 
the ruling party and weakening institutions designed to limit its power.5
The high risks associated with constitution making moments are related to the 
difficulties of constraint at the domestic level. Constitution making usually takes 
place during periods of crisis or transition at which domestic institutions have 
broken down or become broadly illegitimate; powerful leaders can take advantage 
of the resulting vacuums to consolidate power in a durable way. A legal/conceptual 
problem compounds this issue: leading theories of constitution making hold that it 
can properly take place outside of the existing constitutional order, via institutions 
that cannot be controlled by existing institutions. Thus, not only does constitution
making usually take place at moments of domestic institutional weakness, but actors 
can plausibly wield legal theories of constitution making that undermine domestic 
institutions even further. Even where risks of democratic erosion do not materialize, 
the resulting uncertainty in even the basic legal framework can lead to a constitution
making environment exacerbating rather than lessening social and political tension. 
The frequent absence of domestic legal constraint during constitution making 
moments may create a prima facie case for some form of supra national intervention. 
At the least, they demonstrate that such involvement might be useful. However, 
achieving effective international involvement as a solution to abusive constitution
making seems much easier said than done. Strong international norms governing 
constitution making do not exist, may never exist, and perhaps should not exist. 
Other approaches at the international or regional level are similarly either inchoate 
or flawed. As a first step, the goal of this article is to survey the range of possibilities 
and their potential for development, recognizing both the potential utility and 
drawbacks of each approach. 
2.  ALLAN BREWER-CARIAS, THE DISMANTLING OF DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA 39–40 
(2010); David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. 923, 939–40, 971 (2013) 
[hereinafter Landau, Gone Wrong].
3.  BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 2, at 57–60. 
4.  Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai, & Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling the 
Constitution, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 138, 138–40 (2012). 
5.  Id. at 142–44. 
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Part I of this article frames the problem of constraint at the domestic level 
during constitution making processes. While acknowledging that the issue is not 
universal, it argues that the absence of effective constraint from domestic 
institutions is a common one and that this absence is associated with a range of 
longer term problems including the erosion of democracy and the increase in 
political tension associated with “failed” constitution making. Part II considers the 
strengths and drawbacks of four distinct models of international intervention: (1) 
democracy clauses requiring that states abide by their own domestic mechanisms of 
constitutional change, (2) international norms directly governing the procedure or 
substance of constitution making, (3) international organizations or NGOs wielding 
“best practices,” and (4) review of constitution making processes and texts by 
advisory bodies at the supranational level. Part III concludes by arguing that since 
the problem of abusive constitution making is particularly difficult to solve at either 
the domestic or international levels, the most feasible approach involves making 
some use of all of these distinct tools while recognizing each of their limitations. 
I. CONSTITUTION MAKING AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS
This Part argues that constitution making moments often occur during unique 
moments of stress and weakness for the domestic institutional order and, indeed 
themselves can tend to contribute significantly to this stress on existing institutions. 
Section A argues that constitution making, whether undertaken during periods of 
regime transition or within a democratic regime, is often associated with deep crises 
that render existing institutions weak, illegitimate, or both. Section B argues that 
prevailing legal and political theories of constitution making tend to compound this 
tendency by envisioning constitution making as an act by “the people” outside of 
existing constitutional and legal constraints. The effect of these dynamics is to make 
constitution making an activity that is particularly difficult to regulate at the 
domestic level. As Section C notes, this absence of effective domestic constraint 
can have very problematic consequences. 
A. Institutional Dynamics 
The first problem is practical: the political environment in which constitution
making is usually undertaken is one where existing institutions are either eroded, 
have collapsed completely, or are badly tainted by association with the prior regime. 
As Elster notes, the normal situation in which constitution making occurs is not 
where things are going well, but instead where some deep crisis necessitates the 
creation of a new constitution.6 This is of course not inevitable: Chile represents an 
ongoing case of a country seeking to rewrite its constitution during periods of 
6.  Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364, 370 
(1995). 
90 UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law [Vol. 2:87 
relative institutional normalcy.7 And even where a crisis is occurring, as for example 
recently in Iceland, political institutions may maintain sufficient force to block or 
shape the constitution making process.8 But very often, the crisis that spurs 
constitution making will also have undermined domestic political institutions. 
This is easiest to see in cases of constitution making during regime transition. 
Some recent instances of constitution making have occurred after the fall of 
authoritarian regimes, and as a part of a transition process that would supposedly 
end in a democratic order. In these instances, the problem is that all the old 
institutions: courts, legislatures, bureaucracies, the military, etc. may be tainted 
by association with the existing regime. In some cases, they may also have collapsed 
or been gravely weakened through the dynamics preceding and contemporaneous 
with the transition process. Scholarship suggests various ways in which actors might 
work around this problem. Arato, for example, suggests a model of roundtable talks 
followed by temporary constitutions that structure the transition process.9 This 
model essentially makes use of authoritarian era institutions and constitutions (as 
often occurred in Eastern Europe), but breathes new life into them through the 
results of the roundtable talks and gradually phases out old for new institutions.10
The institutions created by the new temporary constitution should have more 
authority to restrain constitution makers than would the institutions associated with 
the old authoritarian regime. 
But in many transitional cases, the preconditions for roundtable talks may not 
be met: contending groups affiliated with both the old and new orders may not 
agree on the basic contours of the process. In those conditions, the ability of the 
authoritarian era institutions to shape constitution making may be very 
problematic. In Egypt, for example, the military and the courts, holdovers from the 
old order, tried to play a significant role in restraining constitution making that was 
controlled by two newly constituted institutions: the Parliament and the 
presidency.11 As examples, the military sought to insert substantive principles into 
the process (with which any final constitution would need to comply), and the 
courts issued significant decisions governing the composition of the Constituent 
Assembly and dissolving it when it did not meet constitutional and legal 
requirements.12 Ideally, the judiciary would be seen as an impartial arbitrator. But in 
the Egyptian case, members of the judiciary were viewed as allies of interests 
7.  See Ryan Dube, Chile’s President Vows to Tackle Corruption, Rewrite Constitution, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
29, 2015, 11:23 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/chiles-president-vows-to-tackle-corruption-
rewrite-constitution-1430321012. 
8.  See Hélène Landemore, Inclusive Constitution-Making: The Icelandic Experiment, 23 J. POL. PHIL.
166, 167–70 (2015). 
9.  ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY, CONSTITUTION, AND LEGITIMACY 149–50 (2000). 
10.  See id. at 145–48. 
11.  Kristen R. Stilt, The End of “One Hand”: The Egyptian Constitutional Declaration and the Rift 
between the “People” and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, 16 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE EASTERN L.
43, 44–49 (2012). 
12.  Id. at 56–58.
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associated with the old order (as well as promoters of its own corporatist interests), 
which hampered its ability to impose legitimate constraints on the constitution
making process.13
Often overlooked is the similarity between transitional and democratic 
constitution making with respect to the weak or tainted nature of existing 
institutions. Democratic constitutional replacement also tends to occur in moments 
where institutions have either collapsed, been gravely weakened, or lost legitimacy. 
The Andean region of Latin America Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and 
Bolivia offers a recent example. Since 1991, a period in which each of these 
countries has been consistently democratic, all four of them have adopted new 
constitutions (twice in the case of Ecuador).14 In all of these cases, constitution
making was conducted in an environment of political crisis, in which existing 
political institutions were seen as at least partly accountable. In Colombia in 1991, 
Venezuela in 1999, and Bolivia beginning in 2006 and ending in 2009, constitution
making broadly took place as part of the end of “pacted” regimes or power sharing 
arrangements between rival parties15 In all cases (although to varying degrees), these 
political arrangements were once seen as working fairly well but in recent years were 
seen as increasingly corrupt as well as incapable of channeling social demands and 
divergent social forces and providing public goods like stability and growth. In 
Ecuador, both the 1998 and 2008 constitutions were preceded by periods of 
extraordinary political instability in which, for example, democratically elected 
presidents were irregularly removed and could not complete their terms.16
By the time constitution making was undertaken in these cases, and again to 
varying degrees, the legitimacy of many existing political institutions was thus 
suspect in all of them. In some, such as Colombia in 1991, ordinary political 
institutions maintained some ability to influence the constitution making process 
(although the Constituent Assembly would eventually revoke the mandate of the 
existing Congress).17 In others, like Venezuela, the old order had basically collapsed 
by the time constitution making occurred.18 After Hugo Chavez won the presidency 
in 1998, he faced opposition control (from the residuals of the old pacted regime) 
of most other institutions in the country (the Congress, the Supreme Court, and 
most local governments, for example). But these institutions were able to exercise 
virtually no influence over the constitution making process which was entirely 
13.  Id. at 58. 
14.  BREWER-CALAIS, supra note 2, at 60, 72–73; Manuel Jose Cepeda-Espinosa, Judicial Activism 
in a Violent Context: The Origin, Role, and Impact of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 3 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 529, 549 (2004); Catherine M. Conaghan, Ecuador: Correa’s Plebiscitary Presidency,
19 J. DEMOCRACY 46 (2008); Eduardo A. Gamarra, Bolivia: Evo Morales and Democracy, in
CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 124, 139, 148–51 (Jorge I. 
Dominguez & Michael Shifter, eds., 3d ed. 2008). 
15.  See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 2, at 42–46; Cepeda-Espinosa, supra note 14, at 540–42, 
548–49; Gamarra, supra note 14, at 127; Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 963–64. 
16.  Conaghan, supra note 14, at 48. 
17.  See Landau, Abusive, supra note 1, at 200–03. 
18.  See Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 939–40. 
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controlled by Chavez’s forces. Indeed, as explained in more detail below, these 
opposition controlled institutions were eventually shut down or cleansed by the 
Chavez controlled Assembly.19 Similar dynamics occurred in Ecuador in 2008, 
where the newly ascendant President Correa and his allies were able to argue that 
the existing institutional order was a large part of the national problem and needed 
to be swept away.20 The broad point, then, is that in democratic constitution making 
as in transitional constitution making, the institutional order is often very weak. 
B. Conceptual Dynamics 
Beyond the fact that institutions during constitution making are often weak, 
tainted, or both, theories of constitution making also often contribute to making it 
a process that is difficult to restrain. Perhaps the leading theory of constitution
making, building off Sieyes and Schmitt, is built around “constituent power.”21 The 
basic idea here is that “the people” retain the ultimate power to remake their 
institutional order. In writing a constitution, they delegate some of their power to 
“constituted powers,” or ordinary political institutions. These institutions have the 
power to make ordinary political decisions and even to carry out exercises of 
constitutional change that fall short of constitutional replacement, for example by 
using textual mechanisms for amendment. All of these acts are restrained by the 
existing constitutional order. But the ultimate act of constitutional replacement can 
be done by “the people” at any time, and can take place outside of the existing 
constitutional order. 
The basic theory of constituent power has some ramifications for the design 
of constitution making processes. Since constitution making is supposed to take 
place outside of the normal institutional rules, specialized bodies like constituent 
assemblies may make more sense as constitution makers than ordinary institutions 
like legislatures. Moreover, these specialized institutions are not bound by the rules 
and restraints put on them by other political institutions, but instead can define their 
own operating rules and competencies. They cannot be regulated by the existing 
constitutional rules or the existing institutional order. Indeed, since the Constituent 
Assembly, once constituted, represents the sovereign power of the people, it can 
limit or shut down the power of other institutions at will. 
Some recent constitution making experiences in the Andes represent a fairly 
clear illustration of the constituent power approach. In Colombia (1991), Venezuela 
(1999), and Ecuador (2008), political actors evoked the constituent power theory to 
remake the institutional order.22 In all of these cases, designers followed processes 
for constitutional replacement that were outside of the existing constitutional 
19.  BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 2, at 73–74. 
20.  Conaghan, supra note 14, at 51–52, 54–56. 
21.  See, e.g., JOEL COLON-RIOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
AND THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUENT POWER 84–86 (2012); see also Mark Tushnet, Peasants with 
Pitchforks, or Toilers with Twitter, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 639, 645–46 (2014). 
22.  Landau, Abusive, supra note 1, at 207; Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 941–43, 951–54. 
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order.23 In each case, presidents called referenda on whether specialized constituent 
assemblies should be called to rewrite constitutions. The assemblies, once 
constituted, were not bound by any limitations that may have been placed on them 
by the existing institutional order. And indeed, in all three cases they shut down 
ordinary institutions so they could be remade or reconstituted.24
The Venezuelan case is perhaps emblematic: the newly elected President Hugo 
Chavez (who was the driving force behind the assembly), went before it and laid 
down his mandate, stating that he would only continue in office if ratified by the 
Assembly (which of course he was, overwhelmingly).25 The assembly then used its 
“original constituent power” to limit the power and composition of the Congress, 
shut down the Supreme Court, and remove hostile local and union officials.26 It also 
issued legislation directly. But constituent assemblies across all three countries 
worked under similar dynamics. The only real difference was the political context
Colombian constitution making was extra textual but based on a broad consensus 
between political forces, while constitution making in both Ecuador and Venezuela 
was dominated by unilateral political forces associated with newly elected presidents 
in each case.27
Constitution making under “constituent power” theories tends to make 
restraint at the domestic level problematic. The reason is obvious: if constitution
making occurs outside, rather than inside, existing constitutional frameworks, then 
existing political institutions may have limited or no ability to restrain constitution
making bodies. Indeed, the Constituent Assembly can plausibly claim an ability to 
shut down any institution that interferes with its decisions. As much recent work 
has argued, this may raise the risk of majoritarian constitution making, where a text 
is imposed by a bare majority on minority groups. Or it may allow for abusive 
constitution making by a powerful individual or party claiming to act on behalf of 
the people.28 That constitution maker, able to unilaterally remake the constitution, 
may be able to entrench themselves in power and weaken institutions intended to 
check their power. The result may be a regime that is less than fully democratic. 
The risk of this outcome does not result from stepping outside of the existing 
institutional order as such. Indeed, the act of stepping outside of the existing 
constitutional order can be either useful or necessary for successful constitution
making. In transition cases, there may be little or no existing institutional order to 
fall back on and restrained constitution making may require bargains with actors 
23.  See Maxwell A. Cameron & Kenneth E. Sharpe, Andean Left Turns: Constituent Power and 
Constitution-Making, in LATIN AMERICA’S LEFT TURNS: POLITICS, POLICIES, & TRAJECTORIES OF 
CHANGE 61, 62 (Maxwell A. Cameron & Eric Hershberg, eds., 2010). 
24.  Id. at 66–69; Landau, Abusive, supra note 1, at 192. 
25.  See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 2, at 49–50. 
26.  See id. at 57–59. 
27.  For example, the Colombian Assembly also revoked the mandate of the legislature and 
called for new elections, and the Ecuadorian Assembly revoked the mandate of various institutions. See
Landau, Abusive, supra note 1, at 207. 
28.  See id. at 191. 
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that are too tainted by affiliation with the authoritarian regime. Even in democratic 
cases, constituent power theory can provide a useful exit in situations where the 
existing institutional order threatens to freeze or block important changes both  
Colombia and Venezuela, which were pacted regimes that had run their course, 
offer plausible examples.29 More recently, Iceland offers a plausible example of a 
case where political elites blocked a needed constitutional replacement, and 
constitution makers thus may have been better off proceeding via extra
constitutional rather than constitutional channels.30 The exit function of 
constitution making via constituent power theory can be a true advantage. 
The problem instead may be that once constitution makers step outside of the 
existing political order, there is no other obvious source of restraint. Political leaders 
may choose, or be forced because of circumstances, to form multi party agreements 
or act by relative consensus. The 1991 Constituent Assembly in Colombia offers an 
example: the process took place outside of the existing constitutional framework 
but was governed by a multi party pact between major political forces.31 In contrast, 
in the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian cases powerful, political actors in both cases 
the president largely acted unilaterally and marginalized opposition political 
forces.32
Theorists have discussed various ways in which restraint might exist within a 
constituent power framework. One possibility is to allow political actors to step 
outside of the existing constitutional framework but to allow or require regulation 
by existing political institutions. This has been the tradition, for example, in many 
of the U.S. states, where limited constituent assemblies governed by rules set by 
legislatures have been fairly common.33 Another possibility is to have courts or 
other domestic institutions use the theoretical construct of “constituent power” to 
limit abusive exercises of constitution making. Not just any act of power is plausibly 
in the name of “the people.” Courts might step in, for example, to verify that 
sufficient support exists to call an assembly, or to ensure that the process itself 
reflects a sufficient level of consensus.34 The Venezuelan Supreme Court attempted 
mild restrictions along these lines, although with little success.35 Suffice it to say that 
in comparative terms, restrictions along either line appear to be fairly difficult to 
impose on constitution making processes, even if they are theoretically possible. 
The theory tends to marginalize existing political institutions (as noted above), and 
29.  See Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 963–64; Renata Segura & Ana Maria Bejarano, Ni
una asamblea mas sin nosotros! Exclusion, Inclusion, and the Politics of Constitution-Making in the Andes, 11 
CONSTELLATIONS 217, 219–20 (2004). 
30.  See Landemore, supra note 8, at 167–70. 
31.  See Cepeda-Espinosa, supra note 14, at 540–42, 548–49. 
32.  See Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2. 
33.  See William Partlett, The American Tradition of Constituent Power (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
34.  See David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Constraining Constitutional Change, 50 WAKE FOR. L.
REV. 859, 876–79 (2015). 
35.  See id.; see also Joshua Braver, Hannah Arendt in Venezuela: The Supreme Court Battles Hugo 
Chávez Over the Creation of the 1999 Constitution, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 555, 557 (2016). 
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it may provide relatively little guidance as to what levels of support are necessary 
for constitution making. For example, it may not be able to easily adjudicate 
between a majoritarian and a consensus based constitution making process, since 
either kind of process can plausibly claim to represent “popular will.” 
Constituent power theory is not, of course, the only theory under which recent 
constitution making has occurred. One might call an alternative theory a “rule of 
law” approach, which is in a sense the opposite of the constituent power approach.36
Rather than being carried out outside of the existing constitutional order, 
constitution making occurs inside and is restrained by the existing constitutional 
text. Some constitutions, for example, contain replacement clauses that govern the 
process by which new constitutions can be made: some acts of constitution making 
turn to these clauses and in other cases, political actors get together and agree on 
changes to the existing constitution that will govern a foreseen act of new 
constitution making. Comparative evidence suggests that this form of constitution
making is also fairly common.37 Nonetheless, I do not think it provides a cure all 
for the problems identified with constituent power theory, for several reasons. 
First, replacement clauses appear to be uncommon. Most constitutions appear 
to say nothing about their own replacement: they contain amendment mechanisms 
but do not regulate the constitution making process.38 Such a constitutional text 
might, of course, be interpreted so as to disallow wholesale replacement, a position 
that might prove unstable. Or they can collapse into a constituent power approach, 
in which case the regulated approach becomes unregulated. Furthermore, even 
where replacement clauses or similar devices exist, they often seem to be unstable 
and contestable. The regulation, rather than serving as a focal point or object of 
consensus, can become a tool wielded by one side (generally a minority group or 
threatened elite), while the other side argues that the regulation is not binding 
because of the nature of the constitution making process. Rather than stabilizing 
constitution making processes, in other words, regulations can, under certain 
conditions, destabilize them. 
The example of Bolivia is an interesting one in this respect. There a president 
installed a replacement clause in 2004, during a deep political crisis, which essentially 
required a special congressional law approved by two thirds of the Congress to 
trigger and regulate a constitution making process by constituent assembly.39 A 
short time but two crisis laden presidencies later, President Evo Morales took 
power at the head of an insurgent political party backed by indigenous movements 
and other traditionally excluded groups.40 Morales sought constitutional 
36.  See Richard Stacey, Constituent Power and Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Constitution in Kenya’s 
Constitution-making Process, 9 J. INT’L CONST. L. 587, 599 (2011). 
37.  Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 961. 
38.  See id.
39.  See generally, Fabrice Lehoucq, Bolivia’s Constitutional Breakdown, 19 J. DEMOCRACY 110 
(2008). 
40.  Id.
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replacement, as did broad sectors of the opposition. The two sides initially agreed 
on a special law to regulate the process, which among other things called for a two
thirds vote in the resulting Constituent Assembly to approve any constitutional 
draft.41 But as the process dragged on, battles erupted between the allies of President 
Morales (who had a majority but lacked a two thirds supermajority in the assembly), 
and the opposition. The former insisted that the assembly had “original constituent 
power” and thus could adopt rules and procedures that differed from those found 
in the congressional enabling law, while the latter argued that the process was a 
regulated one that must be carried out within existing constitutional and legal rules.42
The result was a process in which the rules influenced the text but were constantly 
in danger of being bent or ignored.43 A constitution was finally adopted after a 
tortured three year process, but the final draft was hammered out by negotiations 
in the Congress.44
The constituent power doctrine has in recent years been particularly influential 
in the Andes. But the threat of “constituent power” or similar discourses to 
regulated constitution making processes appears to be a global phenomenon. Take 
two examples of constitution making during political transition. In Russia, the 
legislature and high courts likewise attempted to regulate a constitution making 
process that would be carried out within existing constitutional rules.45 However, 
President Yeltsin eventually won, using the results of a referendum to lift the 
process out of these ordinary institutions and placing it instead in a Constituent 
Assembly appointed by him.46 Critics of the Russian process have argued that the 
resulting constitution helped shaped Russia into a hybrid regime that was less than 
fully democratic.47
Similarly and more recently, the Egyptian constitution making process in 2012 
emerged at times as a battle between the military and the courts, which sought to 
place the constitution making process under the regulation of the existing 
constitution and ordinary laws (by for example imposing “constitutional principles” 
on the process and by dissolving the Assembly when the judiciary determined it had 
been improperly conformed), and the majoritarian political forces surrounding 
President Mohamed Morsi, who argued that the sweeping electoral mandate of 
them and their allies should legitimate the process.48 The Morsi side eventually 
pushed through the constitution using “constituent power” logic: it immunized the 
work of the Assembly from any judicial challenges, enabling to finish the draft. 
41.  Ley Especial de Convocatoria a la Asamblea Constituyente, Mar. 6, 2006, http://www 
.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-3364.pdf. 
42.  For a summary, see Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2. 
43.  See generally Lehouqc, supra note 40. 
44.  See Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 939. 
45.  William Partlett, The Dangers of Popular Constitution-Making, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 193 (2012). 
46.  See id.
47.  See id.
48.  See Nathan Brown, Tracking the Arab Spring: Egypt’s Failed Transition, 24 J. DEMOCRACY 45 
(2013). 
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However, the Morsi government was shortly thereafter removed in a coup.49 The 
point here is not to evaluate any particular constitution making process: in some of 
these cases the end result was at least passable (as in Bolivia), while in others the 
dynamic was plausibly disastrous (as in Egypt). The point instead is that even in a 
supposedly “regulated” constitution making process, the ideology surrounding it 
can put pressure on the basic institutional rules. 
One final point is also worth noting: even where replacement clauses exist and 
are adhered to, they may do relatively little to ensure that the values one would want 
to achieve in a constitution making process are met. That is, regulation is far from 
assurance that a constitution making process is a “good” one. Take the example of 
Hungary. During the transition to democracy, parties used the amendment rules 
found in the old, communist era constitution: a two thirds majority.50 The new 
constitutional text was thought to be temporary, however, and to exist only until a 
wholly new constitution could be written. In 1995, the parliament added a clause 
requiring that the permanent constitution be approved by a four fifths vote.51 The 
Fidesz party won over two thirds of seats with just over a majority of votes in 2009; 
this vote total gave them the ability to amend the constitution unilaterally.52 Using 
their supermajority, they amended many parts of the constitution, including 
provisions dealing with judicial power.53 They also repealed the four fifths clause, 
and then used a two thirds vote to completely replace the existing constitution with 
a new one in 2011.54
Depending on the legal status of the four fifths clause, of course, the 
legitimacy of this process could be contested.55 (It makes little conceptual sense to 
allow legislative actors to remove a more entrenched provision with a lesser vote). 
But even assuming Fidesz acted properly, the two thirds clause would have failed 
to ensure that the process was consensual and deliberative. The scholarly consensus 
instead is that the text was rushed through parliament unilaterally with virtually no 
debate and no participation or input from opposition groups.56 One problem with 
replacement clauses is that they may have very different effects depending on the 
exact contours of the political system. A threshold that might require broad 
consensus in some political environments (such as where fragmentation is high and 
parties are fluid, which was the case shortly after the Hungarian transition), might 
work very differently in other political contexts where one political party is able to 
49.  See id. 
50.  See Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making in Hungary: After Success, Partial Failure,
26 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 19 (2010). 
51.  There is some debate about whether this clause had a sunset date or, once added, was 
permanent. See Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making in Hungary: After Success, Partial Failure,
26 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 19 (2010). 
52.  Id. at 29. 
53.  Miklós Bánkuti, et al., Disabling the Constitution, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 138, 139 (2012). 
54.  See Arato, supra note 52. 
55.  Bánkuti, et al., Disabling the Constitution, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 138, 139 (2012). 
56.  See id.
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gain broad power. The insensitivity of replacement clauses to changes in political 
context might make them particularly problematic as time passes.57
C. Problems Caused by an Absence of Domestic Institutional Constraint 
The link between process and outcome is notoriously difficult to draw with 
respect to constitution making, even for basic variables like levels of public 
participation and inclusion.58 The ability to draw causal inferences of the effect of a 
particular constitution making process is plagued both by problems of endogeneity 
(the constitution making process is not randomly selected, but is likely to reflect 
preexisting patterns of political support) and context dependence (the effect of any 
particular design choice is likely to depend heavily on many other features of the 
political and social context). Nonetheless, the absence of effective domestic 
constraints appears to be associated with two kinds of problems across a range of 
cases. These problems are not inevitable: in some cases, despite the absence of 
domestic legal regulation, the parties may agree on the process or otherwise reach a 
good outcome. But they appear to be common enough to warrant concern. 
The first potential problem is unilateral control of constitution making 
processes by particular individuals or parties, which can lead to “abusive” forms of 
constitution making that undermine democracy. Much recent work, drawn from a 
range of sources including Venezuela, Russia, and Hungary, has argued that 
unilateral domination of the constitution making process can undermine an existing 
or nascent democratic order.59 The hegemonic actor who controls that process may 
be able to shape the constitutional text so that they are more difficult to dislodge, 
tilting the playing field in any future elections. They may also be able to weaken or 
pack control institutions that are designed to limit their power and to protect the 
rights of minority groups. Finally, constitution making may act as a critical juncture 
that allows ascendant political actors to weaken the power of their political 
opponents by rapidly removing them from institutional power bases. Put simply, in 
certain political contexts unrestrained constitution making raises significant risks of 
democratic erosion.60
A second problem is related to an increased risk of political and social conflict 
because of an absence of clear ground rules. During moments of ordinary political 
contestation, contending actors may disagree on their programs but agree on which 
channels and methods may be used to seek power, as well as which institutions are 
charged with making decisions in the event of political disagreement. A peculiar 
feature of constitution making can be to weaken or eliminate the institutions that 
57.  For a similar critique of amendment rules giving special protection to certain clauses, see 
Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional 
Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 606 (2015). 
58.  See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, et al., Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter? 5 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 201 (2009); and Gabriel Negretto, Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of 
Constitutional Change in Latin America, 46 L. & SOC’Y REV. 749 (2012). 
59.  See Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 940. 
60.  See Landau, Abusive, supra note 1, at 191. 
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normally channel these disagreements. Given that constitution making also 
normally takes place in an atmosphere of political crisis, the inability to agree even 
on basic ground rules can heighten tensions between competing groups. 
The Bolivian case referred to above offers one example of such a dynamic. At 
the outset of the constitution making process in Bolivia, there were significant 
tensions between the forces of the new President Morales and the opposition.61
These tensions were based on region, ethnicity, centralization vs. decentralization, 
and economics, among other issues.62 But both sides agreed on the need for a new 
constitution, and their goals may not have been so distinct as to make agreement 
impossible. The process of constitution making was greatly inflamed by disputes 
about whether the Constituent Assembly had original constituent power, who 
would get to determine its rules, and how these rules should be interpreted.63 The 
process ended up heightening political tension between the two groups rather than 
enabling compromise.64 Similarly, in Egypt, debates about the basic parameters of 
the process, and particularly whether the Assembly was subject to legal control from 
the judiciary, inflamed disputes between competing groups and plausibly made it 
more difficult for the political parties who held a democratic majority to 
compromise with elements of the old regime and democratic minorities.65
II. CONSTITUTION MAKING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CRITICAL
REVIEW OF APPROACHES
The prior part argued that domestic institutions are particularly weak during 
constitution making moments, which may make the existence of supra national 
support especially useful. This part surveys existing approaches that might help 
provide such support. It considers several different possibilities: (1) “democracy 
clauses” that police whether a state has followed its own rules; (2) international 
norms governing the procedure or substance of constitution making; (3) 
international organizations and NGOs carrying best practices; and (4) advisory 
institutions at the international level. The analysis concludes that each of these 
approaches may have some promise at limiting abusive acts of constitution making, 
but that all also have serious pitfalls. In the end, scholars and constitutional 
designers may achieve the best results from an approach that seeks modest gains 
from several different models. 
61.  Id.
62.  See generally Lehouqc, supra note 39. 
63.  Id.
64.  See Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 971. Indeed, at one point the tension became so 
bad that the process broke down completely over a peripheral but emotional issue: a proposal to move 
the capital to Sucre, where the Constituent Assembly was sitting. 
65.  See generally Brown, supra note 48. 
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A. Democracy Clauses and Legality 
Perhaps the most straightforward approach would be an order that domestic 
actors need to follow their own rules. This approach has several advantages. Most 
importantly, it is most consonant with what already exists: several regional 
organizations, including Latin America and Africa, have democracy clauses.66 These 
are normally tied to the constitutionality of action taken. The Latin American clause, 
found in article 20 of the Inter American Democratic Charter, allows for the 
suspension of member states in the event of an “unconstitutional alteration of the 
constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member 
state”67 Similarly, article 25 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and 
Governance calls for suspension in the event of an “unconstitutional change of 
government,”68 and the Commonwealth nations similarly commit to action after 
an ”unconstitutional overthrow of a democratically elected government.”69 Thus, 
many regions have a clause that requires that certain fundamental actions changes 
in regime or governance be handled in a constitutional manner.70
This kind of approach is also consonant with some proposals for bringing 
fundamental issues of domestic constitutional governance into the international 
realm. Ex Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki’s proposal for an International 
Constitutional Court, for example, referred to “abuse” of political power by 
domestic actors and the prevention of “illegitimate, bogus elections.”71 Marzouki’s 
suggestion is that at least a large part of the Court’s work would be in preventing 
political leaders from taking actions that violate their own domestic rules. 
The normative attractiveness of such an approach stems from the fact that it 
does not require international actors to construct a set of procedural or substantive 
norms, but instead simply requires that countries abide by rules they have already 
set in place. In that sense, this approach seeks to close the gap between the way 
national leaders say they will behave and the way they actually behave. However, at 
least when it comes to constitution making, the normative attractiveness of the 
model is often overcome by two crippling problems: (1) the difficulty of figuring 
66.  See generally Theodore J. Piccone, International Mechanisms for Protecting Democracy, in
PROTECTING DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 101 (Morton H. Halperin & Mirna Galic, 
eds., 2005). 
67.  Inter-American Democratic Charter art. 20, Sept. 11, 2001, https://www.oas.org/en 
/democratic-charter/pdf/demcharter en.pdf.
68.  African Charter on Elections, Democracy, and Governance art. 25, Jan. 30, 2007, 
http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7790-file-african charter on democracy elections and 
governance.pdf 
69.  Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Declaration art. 3, Nov. 12, 
1995, http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/history-items/documents/millbrook%20 
declaration.pdf 
70.  The Andean Community and Mercosur also include such clauses. See Piccone, supra note 
66, at 108–09. 
71.  Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Session Pivotal If World Leaders 
Ensure Effective Custodianship of Environment, Economic Justice, Social Responsibility, Speaker Says 
in Debate, U.N. Press Release GA/11562 (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014 
/ga11562.doc.htm.
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out when a country has violated its own constitutional rules, and (2) the potential 
irrelevance of whether a country has followed its settled rules on the question of 
constitution making
The first problem afflicts any act of what Dixon and Jackson call 
“extraterritorial constitutional interpretation.”72 While judging the constitutionality 
of an act may be fairly easy at times (a military coup is a paradigmatic example), very 
often it requires difficult issues in judgment. In those cases, actors tend to accept 
the decisions of final constitutional interpreters such as high courts not because they 
are definitely correct, but simply because of their procedural position. External 
interpreters lack the formal procedural authority to act as final constitutional 
interpreters. They also may lack necessary knowledge about the rules and legal 
culture of a system in which they were not trained and have not practiced.73
These problems tend to be particularly acute in exercises of constitutional 
change and constitution making. The reasons why the problems tend to be 
particularly acute were reviewed in the prior part. Constitutional texts often say little 
or nothing about their own replacement. Moreover, whether they are silent or not, 
political leaders may be able to use constituent power doctrine to carry out an act 
of constitution making outside of the existing constitutional framework.74 Whether 
a given act of constitution making is thus “legal” or “constitutional” will often 
involve highly contestable theoretical judgments about the scope of the constituent 
power doctrine in a given context. 
An example from Honduras may be helpful to make this more concrete. In 
2009, then President Manuel Zelaya announced that he would seek a process of 
constitutional replacement of the existing 1982 constitution. Zelaya sought a 
plebiscite, which he later renamed a “nonbinding poll,” on whether to move 
forward with the replacement of the existing constitution.75 Since Zelaya did not 
enjoy congressional support, he tried to move forward unilaterally.76 The results of 
the poll would be counted by the National Institute of Statistics (not the Electoral 
Courts as with ordinary elections) and used to leverage the Congress into approving 
binding steps to move towards a possible constituent assembly.77
The administrative, electoral, and civil courts all issued decisions at different 
points holding that Zelaya could not move forward with the nonbinding poll.78
Their core reasoning was that Zelaya lacked the authority to go forward with a non
72.  Vicki C. Jackson & Rosalind Dixon, Constitutions Inside Out: Outsider Interventions in Domestic 
Constitutional Contests, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 149 (2013). 
73.  See id. 
74.  Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 962. 
75.  See generally Noah Feldman et al., REPORT TO THE COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION OF HONDURAS: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (Mar. 19, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1915214. 
76.  See id. at 5. 
77.  See id.
78.  See id. at 30. 
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binding poll, since such an instrument did not exist under Honduran law.79 Critics 
outside of the courts, which included virtually all of the domestic political class, also 
made a much broader argument: that although he was not explicit on the point, 
Zelaya was actually trying to change the country’s one term limit, which was 
textually unamendable by any means, and therefore that the entire process of 
constitutional replacement was unconstitutional regardless of what route would be 
taken.80 After Zelaya nonetheless moved forward with preparations, high military 
officials came to his house in the morning several days before the poll and put him 
on a plane to Costa Rica. Congress met later that day and named the president of 
Congress as the new national president; Zelaya was never restored to power.81
The Organization of American States (“OAS”) activated the democracy clause 
in response to the military coup removing Zelaya, suspending Honduras from the 
organization for two years as a result.82 Some analysts have argued that the OAS 
also should have utilized or threatened to activate the democracy clause in response 
to the actions of President Zelaya before the coup.83 One problem, though, is that 
while it was reasonable to suppose the Zelaya’s actions may have posed a threat of 
democratic erosion, it was more difficult to determine whether his actions were 
“constitutional” or “unconstitutional.” The sequence of events proposed by Zelaya 
to carry out constitutional replacement was somewhat like that which had been 
proposed and carried out in Colombia in 1991, although under very different 
political conditions: a non binding poll carried out outside of the legal order, 
followed by a binding referendum, followed by a constituent assembly.84 Whether 
preexisting legal authority was necessary for each of these steps is a difficult legal 
question. Even more difficult is the underlying question of whether the 
79.  See id.
80.  See id. at 92.
81.  See id. at 61. 
82.  Interestingly, the removal triggered a non-trivial debate about the legality of the actions of 
the military. Those who supported the removal of Zelaya made various arguments: they argued that an 
arrest warrant for the president had already been issued by the Supreme Court, which is explicitly given 
the power to try, suspend, and remove the president under the Honduran constitution, and that the 
military was a proper entity to serve that warrant given the president’s stature. They also argued that 
the president violated a special constitutional provision stating that anyone seeking to change the 
country’s strict one-term presidential term limit would “immediately cease in office.” See id.; see also
CONST. HOND. art. 239 (prohibiting anyone who has previously served as president from serving again 
and stating that “[h]e who br[eaks] this provision or propose[s] its reform, as well as those who support 
directly or indirectly [that effort], [will] . . . immediately [cease to occupy] . . . their respective 
positions. . ..”). While I was part of a team that rejected these arguments during the Truth and 
Reconciliation process, the fact that they could be made shows that even judging the constitutionality 
of military coups – the classic form of extraconstitutional act – may not always be simple. See also
Jackson & Dixon, supra note 72, at 1–76 (arguing that the legality of those who removed Zelaya was at 
least contestable). 
83.  See JAVIER EL-HAGE, HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, THE FACTS AND THE LAW
BEHIND THE DEMOCRATIC CRISIS OF HONDURAS, 2009: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
DEMOCRACY LAW ANALYSIS 158 (March 2010) http://humanrightsfoundation.org/uploads/The 
Facts And The Law Honduras 2009.pdf 
84.  See Cepeda-Espinosa, supra note 14, at 540–42. 
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“unamendable” one term limit could be removed or rewritten via constitutional 
replacement. It is certainly plausible to argue that the petrified clause could not be 
changed via the textual mechanisms of constitutional amendment, but making it 
untouchable even by constituent assembly, effectively cutting off any route of 
change, is a different thing.85
This leaves one key argument: Zelaya’s actions were different from those of 
other contexts where extra constitutional mechanisms were used like Venezuela, 
Colombia, and Ecuador because the courts in those other countries either 
approved the mechanisms or were silent, while the Honduran courts issued several 
orders for Zelaya to stand down.86 These judicial orders are certainly relevant, but 
they do not make the problem of extraterritorial constitutional interpretation go 
away, even where relevant judgments have been issued (often courts will simply 
avoid weighing in). The problem in the Honduran case is that virtually the entire 
judiciary was aligned with other members of the political elite and against Zelaya. 
Indeed, after the coup, the president of the Supreme Court gave interviews to the 
national and international press defending it, and the court issued several decisions 
legitimating the coup under Honduran constitutional law. 87 At least in 
circumstances like those, which are fairly common during moments of constitution
making, the international community cannot without further examination accept 
the verdict of the domestic courts as the last word on the matter. They are 
participants, not simply arbitrators. 
Even putting aside the difficulties with extraterritorial constitutional 
interpretation during moments of constitution making, there is a separate problem: 
whether a system follows its own rules may be basically orthogonal to the underlying 
procedural values that one would want to promote. The dangers to democracy that 
are posed by a process of constitutional replacement may not depend precisely on 
whether or not that process is “legal” under the existing constitutional order. 
Insisting on legality may in some cases be used as a tool to block a desirable process, 
while in other cases adherence to the formal procedural rules may do little to ensure 
85.  The complexities of the interpretation of the petrified clause were made clear several years 
later – in a 2015 decision, the Honduran Supreme Court held that the one-term limit, as well as the 
clause making it unamendable by any means, were themselves unconstitutional and it excised them 
from the constitutional text. Among other arguments, the Court found that the petrified clause 
threatened to prevent any peaceful mechanism of constitutional change. See David Landau, Honduras:
Term Limits Drama 2.0 - How the Supreme Court Declared the Constitution Unconstitutional,
CONSTITUTIONNET (May 27, 2015), http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/honduras-term-limits-
drama-20-how-supreme-court-declared-constitution-unconstitutional. 
86.  See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 2, at 73; William C. Banks & Edgar Alvarez, The New 
Colombian Constitution: Democratic Victory or Popular Surrender?, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 39, 59–
60 (1991); FELDMAN ET AL., supra note 75, at 38; David Landau, Term Limits Manipulation Across Latin 
America - and What Constitutional Design Could Do About it, CONSTITUTIONNET, (Jul. 21, 2015), 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/term-limits-manipulation-across-latin-america-and-what-
constitutional-design-could-do-about-it 
87.  For details, see Feldman, supra note 75, at 19. 
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such a process. Even a relatively close monitoring of legality or constitutionality may 
thus do little to improve outcomes. 
The Colombian case offers a good example: as already noted, in 1991 the 
political elite used extra textual means to replace the 1886 constitution, since the 
existing text contained no provision whatsoever allowing for a constituent 
assembly.88 Indeed, in a prior case from the 1970s the Supreme Court had struck 
down an attempt to delegate certain powers of constitutional change to such an 
assembly, holding that the method of constitutional change found in the 
constitution (approval by congress in two separate sessions by first a simple and 
then an absolute majority) was exclusive.89 In the lead up to the Constituent 
Assembly of 1991, the Supreme Court changed its doctrine and allowed the 
sequence of events resulting in the calling of the Constituent Assembly on the 
grounds of original constituent power.90
Imagine, however, a counterfactual scenario in which the Court had struck 
down the Assembly and the political elite had moved forward anyway, or in which 
an international body had believed the action to be “unconstitutional” despite the 
legitimation of the country’s high court. A decision blocking the constitutional 
process would have likely prevented an exit from a deep political crisis, since the 
Congress and Supreme Court had stopped many previous efforts at constitutional 
change, leading critics to call Colombia in the 1980s a “blocked society.”91 And it 
would have stopped a process that, despite using extra textual mechanisms, was 
highly consensual rather than unilateral: the resulting text was the result of broad 
agreement between various political movements, representing both the old party 
system and new insurgents. It also included input from a wide range of civil society 
groups. Finally, the resulting constitution has been widely praised as strengthening 
rather than weakening Colombian democracy.92
Alternatively, there are cases where procedural rules have been followed but 
the process nonetheless raised significant risks of democratic erosion. The 
Hungarian case mentioned above is a good example  the Fidesz party arguably 
followed the relevant rules by gaining a two thirds vote, but those rules allowed it 
to unilaterally dominate the process of constitutional replacement, resulting in a 
process that was neither deliberative nor inclusive, and which arguably worked a 
significant erosion of democracy in that country.93
The fact that democracy clauses will sometimes be of little use in regulating 
constitution making need not mean that this will always be the case. The point is 
simply that the attractiveness and feasibility of insisting on adherence to legality is 
88.  See Cepeda-Espinosa, supra note 14, at 545–47. 
89.  See MARIO CAJAS SARRIA, EL CONTROL JUDICIAL A LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL:
COLOMBIA, 1910–2007 (2008). 
90.  See id. 
91.  See Mario Latorre Rueda, Colombia: una sociedad bloqueada, in PARTIDOS Y ELECCIONES EN 
COLOMBIA 173 (Felipe Botero, ed., 2011). 
92.  See Segura & Bejarano, supra note 29, at 232. 
93.  See Bánkuti et al., supra note 4, at 139–40. 
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very contextual. Imagine, for example, a case where the major political actors agree 
on a roadmap for a constitution making process just before such a process is 
initiated. During the process, however, one of the actors (for example, a powerful 
president or party) reneges on the deal and changes the process in some substantial 
respect. In such a case, where domestic institutions are too weak to stop this action, 
it may make sense for international actors to insist that the existing legal roadmap 
be followed. Any legal claim to make a unilateral break with such a recently enacted 
procedural norm is probably weak, and the roadmap itself seems likely associated 
with positive normative values (democracy and social peace, for example) that could 
be imperiled by unilateral constitution making. Even this use, however, would be a 
substantial expansion of the clauses beyond their current focus on military coups 
and similarly flagrantly illegal devices.94
B. Procedural or Substantive International Norms 
Some work has suggested that norms are emerging at the international level to 
govern either the process of constitution making or the substance of constitutional 
texts. While it is possible that at some stage such norms would emerge, it is clear 
that we are far from such a situation. Moreover, it is unclear whether international 
norms of this type would be ineffective or even counterproductive. 
The most commonly cited norm said to be emerging to govern the process of 
constitution making, based both on treaties and custom, is one in favor of public 
participation.95 It is not clear, though, how far such a norm would extend or what 
exactly it would encompass. Hart, for example, argues that the right could plausibly 
include three clusters of activities: electing representatives, voting in referenda, and 
offering input into the constitutional text.96 She notes that there is no clear guidance 
as to which mix of these forms of participation is appropriate in different 
circumstances.97 I will not, at any rate, analyze the question of whether such a norm 
exists or is emerging at the international level; I will instead simply point out that 
even if it were in the process of formation, it may not be an unalloyed good for 
domestic constitution making. 
Many commentators have focused on the ambiguity in the concept of public 
participation in constitution making. It encompasses a range of different activities, 
some more “active” and others more “passive.”98 Moreover, it appears to be easy 
to design popular participation mechanisms so that they appear to be robust, but 
94.  See Piccone, supra note 66, at 233. 
95.  See Thomas M. Franck & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Norms of International Law Relating to the 
Constitution-Making Process, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN 
CONSTITUTION MAKING 3, 3 (Laurel E. Miller, ed., 2010); see also Vivien Hart, Constitution Making and 
the Right to Take Part in a Public Affair, supra, at 20; Abrak Saati, Participatory Constitution-Making as a 
Transnational Legal Norm: Why Does It “Stick” in Some Contexts and Not in Others?, 2 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L
TRANSNAT’L AND COMP. L. 113 (2017). 
96.  See Hart, supra note 95, at 42–44. 
97.  See id.
98.  See, e.g., Ginsburg & Elkins, supra note 58, at 214–19. 
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actually play a function that is closer to window dressing. Referenda or elections are 
of course very sensitive to the precise voting rules chosen, and can also be 
manipulated through outright fraud or subtler forms of influence. More active 
forms of participation, such as holding consultation sessions or encouraging 
popular input into the constitutional text, also vary widely. In some cases these may 
exercise significant influence on the final constitutional text. In others, however, 
their actual influence may be slight. In yet a third case, popularly supported 
provisions, such as those governing constitutional rights, may actually be used as 
compensation for other provisions that support authoritarianism.99 So a mere 
requirement of participation, without much greater teeth, may do little to improve 
the outcomes of constitution making. 
In fairness, those supporting the emergence of such a requirement 
acknowledge its ambiguity they argue that further practice will be needed to define 
its contours. But even a well developed right to popular participation may involve 
tradeoffs that have not fully been processed in existing work. The empirical 
literature gives little guidance as to which aspects of constitution making actually 
result in more desirable outcomes. Some recent work suggests that public 
participation is correlated with those outcomes, while other work suggests more 
skepticism about their effect. At least in some cases, for example, inclusion of a full 
range of political elites  all or most major parties or movements  at the bargaining 
table may be more important than the level or type of popular participation in the 
constitution making process. In those cases, an international mandate for popular 
participation may overshadow more important concerns. 
More dramatically, pushing towards popular participation may actually make 
it less likely that designers of a process will achieve other goals. Some recent 
empirical work suggests that levels of popular participation are actually used to 
compensate for low levels of inclusion: when key sectors of political elite are 
excluded from a constitution making process, constitutional designers compensate 
for this shortcoming by including passive forms of participation, like referenda, or 
more active forms, like popular input into the text.100 Although participation and 
inclusion may act as substitutes for constitutional designers seeking legitimacy, they 
are not necessarily equivalent in terms of their effect on outcomes: leaving out a 
significant sector of the political elite may be especially destabilizing. Furthermore, 
as Elster points out, some forms of participation may also make it more difficult to 
reach elite consensus because different factions will be forced to play to their 
political bases rather than deliberating and compromising privately.101 Many of the 
Eastern European constitutions in the 1990s were written with relatively low levels 
99.  Something like this may have happened in the 2008 constitution-making process in 
Ecuador, which both contained a large number of rights and instantiated a competitive authoritarian 
regime led by President Correa. 
100.  See Negretto, supra note 58. 
101.  See Elster, supra note 6, at 388. 
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of public participation but high levels of inclusion through round table talks and 
similar devices, in part because of this perceived need.102
None of this is meant to argue that popular participation in constitution
making is a bad thing. Some empirical work suggests that it does improve outcomes, 
although too little to make any definitive claims.103 It may also be possible to design 
participation so that trade offs do not materialize or are less sharp. Some analysts 
have argued, for example, for an hour glass shaped form of participation in which 
levels are high at the beginning of the process (to activate it and determine its basic 
procedural and substantive shape) and the end (to legitimate it), but lower in the 
middle to allow elite bargaining.104 In particular contexts, this proposal or another 
one may make sense. But the imposition of a robust and more specific 
“participation” norm at the international level is at best premature and at worst may 
impose too much uniformity on design choices that should properly be dependent 
on context. We have not yet developed a plausible list of best practices in 
constitution making, if such a list is even feasible. 
Perhaps even more difficult would be the emergence of substantive norms or 
practices governing the content of constitutional texts. Given that democratic 
governance itself is not an international right, the possibility of international norms 
governing aspects of constitutional texts may seem very unlikely at least at the 
international rather than the regional level. But even if the emergence of such norms 
were more imaginable, it is doubtful that they could be designed in an effective way. 
The main reason lies in the dynamics of modern “hybrid” or “competitive 
authoritarian” regimes, which seem to rest on particular combinations of formal 
and informal norms. First, those regimes often seem to rely on particularly 
problematic combinations of formal norms, rather than any single provision 
operating independently.105 Scheppele has argued that the new Hungarian 
constitution created a “Frankenstate” composed of the aggregation of a large 
number of different elements that existed in other democratic states, although as 
problematic rather than salutary features.106 The Hungarian constitution 
amalgamated all of these features such as gerrymandering, restrictions on judicial 
jurisdiction, and less independent appointment procedures for courts and checking 
institutions into a particularly virulent combination. 
A related point is that the negative effects of new constitutions may rest 
heavily on contextual features, or on the interaction between formal and informal 
norms, rather than on isolated features of the text. In Venezuela, for example, 
President Chávez’s constitution in 1999 did increase presidential power, but merely 
102.  See Jon Elster, Constitution-making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea, 71 
PUB. ADMIN. 169, 188–92 (1993). 
103.  See Todd A. Eisenstadt et al., When Talk Trumps Text: The Democratizing Effects of Deliberation 
during Constitution-Making, 1974–2011, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 592 (2015). 
104.  See id.
105.  See Kim L. Scheppele, The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists Do Not 
Work, 26 GOVERNANCE 559 (2013). 
106.  Id. at 560–62. 
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took a presidency that was perhaps the weakest in the region and made it one of the 
stronger ones, although still well within Latin American norms. The greatly 
increased effect of presidential power was caused by these formal changes coupled 
with other aspects of the constitution where the president warped or worked around 
formal norms; for example, by declining to effectively implement a civil society 
commission that was supposed to exercise a significant role over judicial 
appointments.107 By working around the commission, Chávez was able to control 
those appointments unilaterally.108
In some cases, these problems may be overcome, although probably much 
more readily at the regional than the international level. It is imaginable, for example, 
that Latin America or Africa might eventually reach some consensus on the question 
of presidential term limits. Unlike many other parts of a constitutional text, the 
terms limits issue can arguably be analyzed in isolation, and at least within broad 
parameters in a universal way. Term limits at least in presidential regimes may 
exercise a clear influence on the political order irrespective of the content of the rest 
of the constitution. Although Latin America currently seems to be going the other 
way (more countries are currently removing term limits than adding them) one 
could imagine the region eventually determining that at least some designs, like 
allowing presidents to serve for life with no break, were too dangerous or too 
associated with authoritarianism to be permissible.109 Even if some such norms 
eventually emerge, however, they are unlikely to play a major role in preventing 
democratic erosion. 
C. International Civil Society and Best Practices 
This leaves a set of possibilities that are more advisory in scope. First, many 
commentators have noted the rise of involvement of international organizations 
and NGOs in constitution making over the past several decades. In some 
circumstances, these groups can exercise a significant influence over the shape of 
constitutional process and the resulting constitutional text. For example, the 
international community has been heavily involved in constitution making in some 
post conflict situations. Across many other cases, international civil society groups 
have played a significant advisory role in the constitution making process. An 
extreme example of this is the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the 
constitution itself was drafted as part of an international peace agreement.110
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The involvement of international organizations has plausibly improved 
constitution making across a range of cases. That said, there are a few cautions to 
concluding that the involvement of these actors have effectively “internationalized” 
constitution making and ameliorated the problems noted in Part I. The first is 
simply a point about selection. International involvement is not evenly distributed 
or a part of every constitution making process: these entities are heavily involved in 
some processes but much less involved in others. The involvement of international 
actors may to some degree be endogenous to other characteristics of the domestic 
and international political landscape. 
In part, levels of international involvement seem to depend on the interests of 
international actors and the perceived importance of the country in question. At the 
domestic level, involvement of international actors will often depend on the goals 
of dominant political actors. In the ongoing process in Chile, for example, the 
government has invited in a broad range of international actors, perhaps as a way 
to increase domestic legitimacy and support despite right wing opposition.111 But in 
both Hungary (2011) and Venezuela (1999), international actors played virtually no 
role in discussions around constitutional process and text.112 In both cases, political 
leaders who had engineered a rapid and exclusionary process plausibly viewed 
international involvement as an obstacle to their aims. Those cases where 
democratic erosion is most possible may also be cases where international 
involvement tends to be slight. 
The other major caution is about the state of the field, or the existing and 
perhaps inevitable gaps in our levels of knowledge. International involvement can 
without question be helpful in showing domestic designers the full range of 
comparative experience and in demonstrating the pitfalls and promise of 
approaches tried elsewhere. Still, best practices are sometimes formulated without 
a sufficient empirical base, or on a small number of case studies. The popular 
participation norm, for example, is one often pushed by international actors, 
sometimes based on the paradigmatic case of South Africa.113 However, as noted in 
the prior section, the empirical evidence for the impact of participation is mixed, 
and we still do not fully understand its tradeoffs with other aspects of the 
constitutional process. There are real limits to the advice that can plausibly be given 
by international organizations and NGOs. 
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D. Advisory Bodies 
Finally, in some cases advisory organizations at the international level have 
played a role in monitoring constitutional change and constitution making. A good 
example is the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, which has become a 
relevant actor in some of the recent threats to democracy in Eastern Europe. The 
Commission’s mandate is advisory: it has the ability to review legal measures and 
other instruments and to make recommendations in order to move towards “the 
dissemination and consolidation of a common constitutional heritage” in Europe.114
Since 2010, for example, the Commission has offered several opinions 
reviewing the new Hungarian constitution as well as laws intended to implement it. 
In a 2011 opinion, the Commission critiqued the exclusionary, non participatory, 
and rapid and non transparent nature of the constitution making process.115 It also 
expressed concerns over some of the substantive provisions of the new 
constitution, such as the limitations on the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. 
The Commission also issued opinions reviewing several of the “cardinal laws” 
intended to implement key parts of the constitution: it critiqued several aspects of 
the laws regulating the judiciary, Constitutional Court, and prosecution service.116
The Venice Commission’s work in the Hungarian case, as well as other recent 
Eastern European episodes, has been subject to criticism.117 Critics have argued, for 
example, that the Commission’s analyses have tended to take pieces of legislation in 
isolation, rather than holistically  a variant of the “Frankenstate” problem noted 
above. They have also argued that the Commission has demonstrated insufficient 
knowledge of the facts on the ground.118 But at least potentially, an advisory 
commission approach offers advantages over other models on both scores. A body 
like the Venice Commission is not restricted to determining whether domestic 
actors have followed their own rules, or analyzing aspects of procedure or substance 
in isolation. It can instead potentially make a relatively holistic review of the effect 
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of procedure or substantive provisions, and one based on the impact actions and 
provisions in practice, rather than simply on paper. Moreover, the Venice 
Commission is not restricted to identifying violations of domestic and international 
law, but can instead push states towards best procedural and substantive practices, 
in light of common European constitutional heritage.119
Of course, the advisory nature of the Commission’s review may limit its 
effectiveness, which is another common critique.120 The Hungarian government 
made some legal changes in response to the Commission’s recommendations, but 
it did not change its approach; the changes were generally cosmetic.121 The review 
of an advisory body like the Commission could gain more teeth if it was utilized by 
other international actors with binding authority to sanction a noncompliant state. 
In Europe, this is at least a theoretical possibility because of the existence of actors 
like the European Commission. In 2014 The European Commission adopted a 
multi step procedure for responding to threats to the rule of law, but it is too soon 
to know whether it will take effective action in response to significant problems 
noted by the Venice Commission.122 Advisory bodies may also influence 
constitution making through other routes: they might, for example, embolden 
domestic institutions like courts to take tougher stances against abusive 
constitution making practices. 
One could imagine seeking to generalize advisory bodies like the Venice 
Commission outside of the European context. President Marzouki’s International 
Constitutional Court proposal envisioned an advisory role for the Court in 
developing best practices and analyzing national legal changes, in addition to an 
adjudicative role.123 But it would be very difficult to develop international best 
practices, at least in terms of constitution making, for the reasons noted above. 
Perhaps more feasible would be the expansion of advisory bodies at the regional 
level, where problems of reaching substantive and procedural consensus might be 
less dire, if still complex. 
Take Latin America as a potential case study. Although significant human 
rights and other regional institutions do exist in the region, the overall network of 
international institutions is much less dense than what is found in Europe, and those 
that do exist are less effective. It may not be easy for regional states to agree even 
on an advisory commission to govern domestic constitutional and legal design. 
Moreover, even if states did agree on such a body, it is unclear what a “Latin 
American heritage” in constitutional and legal design would look like. 
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The recent constitution making experiences in the Andes, for example, offer 
both a procedural and substantive challenge to prevailing liberal models. From a 
procedural perspective, they permit exclusion of prevailing political elite in return 
for participatory processes that offer input to historically marginalized groups.124
From a substantive perspective, they perhaps weaken horizontal institutions of 
accountability in return for strengthening direct popular control over the governing 
class via devices like recalls and referenda and the inclusion of new forms of 
rights.125 In both cases, the basic idea is that liberal democratic models can stand as 
obstacles to the achievement of social transformation and the inclusion of 
marginalized groups. The existence of this model shows that even within a region 
where there is broad agreement on basic norms of democracy, broad divergence in 
both the process and substance of constitution making can persist. This 
disagreement does not make the establishment of advisory bodies impossible, but 
it does significantly complicate the task. 
III. CONCLUSION
This article had two major goals. The first was to argue that the particular 
institutional and legal circumstances of constitution making mean that domestic 
restraint is often problematic, and this absence of restraint is associated with 
significant common problems: the erosion of democracy and increase in political 
tension. The second was to suggest that international actors give some additional 
attention to this problem, by reviewing the ways various existing models could be 
strengthened to take better account of it. 
The review of potential international solutions in Part II suggests that abusive 
constitution making is a very difficult issue to tackle at the international level. All of 
the plausible solutions  democracy clauses, international norms, best practices, 
and advisory bodies have substantial drawbacks. Some are very difficult to 
deepen; others might threaten to do more harm to domestic constitution making 
than good, either by privileging the wrong goals or by imposing uniform models on 
what is a very contextual process. But flawed is, in this context, a long way from 
useless. Given the importance of the threat posed by some acts of constitution
making, the most sensible solution is to seek realistic and incremental progress 
across a range of the models reviewed here. 
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